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Abstract 29 
Objectives: Whereas accounts of skilled performance based on automaticity (Beilock & Carr, 30 
2001; Fitts & Posner, 1967) emphasize reduced cognitive involvement in advanced skill, 31 
other accounts propose that skilled performance relies on increased cognitive control 32 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). The objective of this study was to test predictions differentiating 33 
the automaticity and cognitive control accounts by assessing thinking during golf putting. 34 
Design: The cognitive processes of less-skilled and more-skilled golfers were examined 35 
during putting using concurrent, think-aloud verbal reports. The design included putting 36 
conditions that differed in complexity and thus the need to adapt the putt to the particular 37 
conditions. 38 
Method: Putting complexity was manipulated via changes to putt length and perceived stress 39 
during putting. Putts were executed from two starting locations (i.e., the same starting 40 
location as the previous putt or a new starting location).  41 
Results: The analysis showed that, during putting: more thoughts were verbalized overall by 42 
more-skilled golfers than less-skilled golfers; both groups verbalized more thoughts overall 43 
during higher-complexity putts (i.e., longer distance putts, and putts under higher stress when 44 
executed from a new starting location) than lower-complexity putts; and the two groups did 45 
not differ significantly in the number of thoughts related to motor mechanics. 46 
Conclusions: The results of this study provide support for a cognitive control account of 47 
skilled performance and suggest that the path to skilled performance involves the acquisition 48 
of more refined higher-level cognitive representations mediating planning and analysis. 49 
Keywords: Cognitive control; concurrent verbalizations; conscious control; expert 50 
performance; think-aloud; verbal reports   51 
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Cognitive Mediation of Putting: Use of a Think-aloud Measure and Implications 52 
for Studies of Golf-putting in the Laboratory 53 
 Many theories of skill acquisition, such as Fitts and Posner’s (1967) three-stage 54 
model and Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (1986) skill acquisition theory, characterize skill learning 55 
as transitions from cognitive control to eventual automatic execution. These theories assert 56 
that, early in learning, successful performance requires the execution of a sequence of 57 
cognitive steps. With extended practice, components of a skill gradually become encoded 58 
together as integrated units in long-term memory (LTM). The skill is then performed by 59 
recognition of patterns and direct retrieval of integrated actions from LTM, requiring less 60 
attention and eventually becoming automatic, where proficient processing cannot be changed 61 
in response to cognitive control (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In contrast to these theories, 62 
Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) long-term working memory (LTWM) theory proposes that, 63 
while automaticity-based theories of skill acquisition apply to the performance of many 64 
“everyday” tasks, they do not apply to the performance of tasks for which individuals are 65 
motivated to attain or maintain expert performance. According to LTWM theory, experts 66 
intentionally resist the normal tendency toward automaticity in order to maintain cognitive 67 
awareness and control of performance so they can monitor, evaluate and change performance 68 
to improve it during practice. In this paper, we will explore these competing accounts of 69 
skilled performance, which we refer to as the “automaticity” and “cognitive control” 70 
accounts, respectively. In the next section, we will review the evidence supporting the 71 
automaticity account in relation to the performance of motor tasks. 72 
Skill Acquisition Accounts Based on Automaticity 73 
Skill acquisition theories based on automaticity (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Fitts & 74 
Posner, 1967) offer two key testable predictions. First, these theories propose that expert 75 
performance is controlled by integrated actions retrieved directly from LTM that do not 76 
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require explicit conscious processes for their execution. Consequently, experts’ retrieval of 77 
the details of cognitive processes mediating their performance is predicted to decrease as a 78 
function of skill (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Second, if experts are instructed to try to attend to 79 
the individual steps originally involved in executing a task, they are assumed to retrieve the 80 
integrated units from LTM into working memory and then have to decompose them into 81 
slower and less proficient control structures (Masters, 1992). This additional cognitive 82 
activity is predicted to interfere with normal execution and thus degrade performance. 83 
Empirical support for these two claims is reviewed below. Space limits constraint our review 84 
to a small but representative set of studies. We first examine whether verbal report 85 
procedures used in studies of experts’ thoughts during performance elicit data that accurately 86 
reflect their thoughts, and then whether disruptions to performance caused by instructions to 87 
participants to monitor their performance actually provide evidence of the absence of 88 
cognitive control.  89 
Beilock and Carr (2001, Experiments 1 & 2) asked novice and expert golfers to 90 
provide written responses concerning their episodic memory for the last putt in a putt series. 91 
On average, novices reported around two more steps than experts concerning motor 92 
mechanics (e.g., hand positions on putter, swing action), which is consistent with the 93 
automaticity account that experts have poorer recall than novices of the detailed steps of their 94 
performance. However, the episodic recall instructions used by Beilock and Carr (2001, 95 
Experiments 1 & 2) differ from the standard procedures for eliciting “think-aloud” 96 
verbalizations (Eccles, 2012; Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011). Beilock and Carr’s (2001) 97 
instructions asked participants to: “Pretend that your friend just walked into the room. 98 
Describe the last putt you took, in enough detail so that your friend could perform the same 99 
putt you just took” (p. 725). Thus, participants were asked to describe and explain what they 100 
did rather than merely report on their thoughts. In a review, Fox et al. (2011) found that 101 
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generating explanations of one’s task performance changed the performance and thus did not 102 
reflect thoughts generated during a normal task performance. Also, when Beilock and Carr’s 103 
participants provided their written descriptions, they may have been selective in their recall 104 
and made inferences based on their extensive knowledge of golf obtained, for example, by 105 
interactions with instructors. Furthermore, written descriptions often differ in accuracy from 106 
descriptions given orally (Kellogg, 2007). Finally, Beilock and Carr’s participants may have 107 
experienced difficulties in recalling details of their last putt, due to the delay between their 108 
last putt and when they began their written putt description. In summary, Beilock and Carr’s 109 
recall method is unlikely to have yielded valid and accurate data reflecting golfers’ actual 110 
thoughts during a single, specific putt.  111 
 Toner and Moran (2011) published a more recent study supporting the automaticity 112 
account. In one condition, expert golfers performed 10 putts under normal, silent conditions 113 
and then, immediately after the 10th putt, were asked “to state aloud any thoughts relating to 114 
the task of which they were consciously aware” (p. 678). Their procedure for eliciting “think-115 
aloud” verbalizations differs from the standard methods (Fox et al., 2011) and they recorded 116 
only 39 thoughts in total for all 18 golfers (Table IV, p. 680). The most frequent verbalized 117 
thought was “just look at the target” (p. 680). Toner and Moran concluded that their findings 118 
support Beilock and Carr’s (2001) view that “a lack of ‘on-line’ attentional control” (p. 681) 119 
facilitates expert performance. 120 
In a subsequent study, Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes (2002, Experiment 1) 121 
required experienced golfers to consciously monitor a component of their stroke while 122 
putting and found this activity interfered with their putting performance, supporting the view 123 
that attention to individual task steps interferes with normal task execution. Wulf and 124 
colleagues (Wulf, 2013; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001) identified attentional conditions 125 
leading to decrements in performance. In the 2013 review, Wulf showed that directing 126 
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attention to movement effects (i.e., external focus) benefits performance and learning more 127 
than directing attention to the movements themselves (i.e., internal focus). According to Wulf 128 
et al.’s constrained action hypothesis, adopting an external focus allows individuals to utilize 129 
faster reflex loops that operate automatically, whereas an internal focus constrains the motor 130 
system and disrupts these automatic processes. These studies imply that imposing the 131 
requirement of conscious control degrades performance by disrupting automatic processes 132 
that normally regulate movement. Since Wulf et al.’s and Beilock et al.’s (2002) studies, 133 
there have been many demonstrations that requiring skilled individuals to attend to particular 134 
performance components results in performance decrements (for a review, see Winter, 135 
MacPherson, & Collins, 2014). 136 
However, Toner and Moran (2011) found that conscious attention can be deployed to 137 
control and foster performance improvements without negatively affecting performance. 138 
When the expert golfers in their study made a conscious adjustment to “their technique in a 139 
manner that improved or ‘fixed’ a flawed aspect of their movement” (p. 681), putting 140 
performance was unaffected. An important difference between Toner and Moran’s study and 141 
the studies showing interference (e.g., Beilock et al., 2002) is that Toner and Moran allowed 142 
their experts freedom to select which aspect to focus attention on but, in the studies showing 143 
interference (e.g., Beilock et al., 2002), the experimenters decided which particular 144 
performance component should be monitored. No interference study has collected 145 
participants’ thought data in the experimental conditions to compare them with their thoughts 146 
while putting normally. A first step towards better understanding the effects of conscious 147 
control on performance would involve collecting verbal reports of thinking during normal 148 
putting performance (Kearney, 2015). In summary, our review of studies supporting the 149 
automaticity account shows that the methods in these studies have important shortcomings 150 
that cast doubt on the validity of the data in these studies for making inferences about the 151 
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nature and frequency of experts’ thought processes. We now outline the cognitive control 152 
account of skilled performance. 153 
Skill Acquisition Accounts Based on Cognitive Control and LTWM 154 
The cognitive control account of skilled performance (Ericsson, 2006a, 2006b; 155 
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) involves a contrast between the acquisition of expert performance 156 
in a specific domain and skill acquisition in everyday life. For “everyday” tasks such as tying 157 
shoelaces or a daily bicycle ride to work, individuals are motivated to achieve only a 158 
satisfactory level of performance, which, once reached, there is no motivation to improve. 159 
Thus, decreases in cognitive control that follow extensive engagement in everyday tasks are 160 
acceptable and in many cases desirable because they lead to reductions in physical and 161 
mental effort required to complete these tasks. In contrast, during the acquisition of expert 162 
performance, performers cannot settle for a satisfactory performance and instead continually 163 
strive to enhance their performance. To this end, they seek to increase their cognitive control 164 
over performance by engaging in deliberate practice activities that change and improve 165 
current performance (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). 166 
Research on expert performers has been undertaken in many different domains of 167 
expertise such as chess, medicine, music, and sports (e.g., McRobert, Ward, Eccles, & 168 
Williams, 2011). Reviews of this research (Ericsson, 2006a, 2006b) have shown that when 169 
experts are instructed by researchers to perform challenging tasks while thinking aloud, 170 
verbalizations of their thoughts reveal that expert performance is underpinned by complex 171 
cognitive processes and an extended working memory, which is known as long-term working 172 
memory (LTWM). LTWM affords rapid and efficient storage of, and access to task-relevant 173 
information in LTM, and effectively functions to enhance the otherwise acutely limited 174 
storage and processing capacities of working memory during ongoing task performance 175 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). During training, expert performers attempt to change aspects of 176 
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their performance and rely on their working memory to be able to plan, evaluate, and modify 177 
their performance. This framework argues that the refined mental representations acquired by 178 
experts as they engage in deliberate practice provide more specific input to the motor system, 179 
which increases their control over the outcomes of their performance (Ericsson, 2006a, 180 
2006b). The central claim is that performance can be improved by cognitively controlling 181 
motor system activity without breaking the action into its original sequence of steps. 182 
 In line with this theorizing, Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain (2016) proposed that 183 
more cognitive control is required at “higher levels” of performance concerned with strategic 184 
features of a task. By comparison, less direct cognitive control is required at “lower levels” of 185 
performance concerned with the mechanisms underlying movement production because 186 
mechanical control “involves relatively stable relations” (p. 49). For example, some 187 
component skills involved in the task of driving such as braking may remain relatively 188 
invariant, whereas higher-level features of driving, such as anticipating and adapting to 189 
changing and challenging traffic situations, are more complex and require ongoing cognitive 190 
control. It is important to note that both the automaticity and the cognitive control accounts 191 
propose that increases in skill are accompanied by the development of higher-level 192 
representations for planning actions (i.e., strategic features of a task). However, only the 193 
cognitive control account proposes that, as skill increases, individuals retain the ability to 194 
control those lower-level aspects (i.e., mechanical features) of a task that can allow improved 195 
adaptation to the encountered situations.  196 
In summarizing the two accounts of skilled performance, the automaticity account 197 
proposes that skilled performance is controlled by integrated actions that do not require 198 
explicit conscious processes for their execution. In contrast, the cognitive control account 199 
proposes that “cognitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled 200 
action” (Christensen et al., 2016, p. 37). Although less cognitive control might be required at 201 
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lower-level aspects of performance under stable conditions, skilled individuals retain the 202 
ability to cognitively control those aspects to adapt in the face of complex situations. 203 
The Current Study 204 
The goal of this study was to test predictions differentiating the automaticity and 205 
cognitive control accounts by assessing thinking during the task of golf putting. To this end, 206 
the study was designed to include putting conditions that differed in complexity and thus the 207 
need for control. Specifically, putting complexity was manipulated via changes to putt length 208 
and perceived stress during putting. To assess the effect of golf skill on verbalized thoughts 209 
during putting, the study involved two groups of golfers at different levels of skill, which is 210 
similar to earlier studies (e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001). However, there were also key 211 
differences between our study and earlier studies that allowed us to address limitations of the 212 
methods used in these earlier studies. First, our study used the most direct method of eliciting 213 
thought data, which involves thinking aloud concurrent with task performance (Ericsson & 214 
Simon, 1993). A recent meta-analysis (Fox et al., 2011) found that this method is not 215 
significantly reactive (i.e., does not change performance accuracy), yet provides valid data on 216 
thinking processes when generating verbalizations of thoughts is possible and time is 217 
available to increase the duration of task completion. 218 
Second, participants in our study putted twice from the same location before the 219 
location was changed so we could assess the effects on thinking of putting from the same as 220 
well as different locations. Our interest in this assessment was based on Winter et al.’s (2014) 221 
concerns that laboratory studies of putting using artificial greens might not capture the 222 
complexities of putting in competition, where every putt must be made from a new location. 223 
Many studies have required participants to putt from the same location. Beilock and Carr’s 224 
(2001, Experiment 1) participants putted from the same location (“neither the green nor the 225 
lie of the ball changed during the experiment”, p. 706), and Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, and 226 
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Carr (2004, Experiment 2) used the same location for all 260 putts made in their study. 227 
However, Beilock and Carr’s (2001, Experiment 2) participants putted from nine different 228 
locations. Toner and Moran’s (2011) participants made multiple (i.e., at least 15) putts from 229 
the same location prior to the collection of think-aloud data.  230 
Third, our study included only two practice putts, during which the participant 231 
thought aloud, prior to the main testing phase; the putt location and distance was the same for 232 
the 2 practice putts but the putt distance was different between the practice putts and the putts 233 
used in the main testing phase. The rationale for this aspect of our study design was that a 234 
golfer has only one opportunity to putt from a given location during competition on a golf 235 
course, yet many studies have not analysed the first putts from a given location and, in fact, 236 
have discarded the first putts as practice. For example, Beilock et al.’s (2002, Experiment 1; 237 
2004, Experiment 2) participants made 20 practice putts prior to the testing phase; Beilock et 238 
al.’s (2004, Experiment 1) participants made 55 putts prior to the putts that were included in 239 
the analysis; and Beilock and Carr’s (2001, Experiments 1 & 2) participants made at least 70 240 
putts before information was collected on the execution of their final putt. 241 
Finally, in the current study, two putt distances (101 cm [3.3 feet] & 203 cm [6.7 242 
feet]) were used that differed markedly in difficulty and thus, we hypothesized, the need for 243 
control. By contrast, in studies by Beilock and colleagues (Beilock & Carr, 2001, Experiment 244 
2; Beilock et al., 2002, Experiment 1; Beilock et al., 2004, Experiment 1), putt distances 245 
varied only from 1.2 - 1.5 m (3.9 - 4.9 feet), and Toner and Moran (2011) used a uniform putt 246 
distance of 2.5 m (8.2 feet).  247 
According to the automaticity account, skilled performers would be predicted to 248 
recognize the patterns associated with complex putting conditions and directly retrieve from 249 
LTM an appropriate integrated response, as long as these conditions are within the range of 250 
their golf experience. Consequently, for the different conditions of putting in our study, the 251 
12 
 
thoughts generated and verbalized by more-skilled golfers should be uniformly few in 252 
number and unaffected by experimental manipulations. In contrast, the cognitive control 253 
account predicts that skilled performers are motivated to develop and maintain cognitive 254 
control over the task conditions, which implies that more thoughts, on the average, would be 255 
generated as the complexity of the putting conditions increases. Therefore, in this study, 256 
more-skilled golfers should verbalize more thoughts as putt complexity increases. With 257 
respect to less-skilled performers, both competing accounts predict that more cognitive 258 
control is necessary and thus more thoughts would be predicted to be verbalized as the 259 
complexity of the putting conditions increases. Less-skilled performers would be predicted to 260 
verbalize more thoughts than more-skilled performers according to the automaticity account 261 
and the reverse pattern would be predicted by the cognitive control account. 262 
Method 263 
Participants 264 
The study involved 52 participants, who formed two groups. The less-skilled group 265 
(Mage = 21.65 years, SD = 2.87) comprising 19 males and 7 females had an average handicap 266 
of 23.19 (SD = 8.18), an average of 5.84 years (SD = 3.32) of golfing experience, and on 267 
average played golf for 2.15 hours (SD = 1.95) per week. The more-skilled group (Mage = 268 
21.85 years, SD = 3.90) comprising 26 males1 had an average handicap of 4.42 (SD = 3.34), 269 
an average of 11.05 years (SD = 4.27) of golfing experience, and on average played golf for 270 
12.42 hours (SD = 7.20) per week. Groups differed significantly by handicap (p < .001) but 271 
not age (p = .840). Participants were students at a large public university in the US and were 272 
recruited via the university’s central research participant pool or advertisements posted at 273 
various campus locations including the university’s golf course clubhouse. Institutional 274 
approval of the testing protocol was obtained and all participants provided informed consent.  275 
Task 276 
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Participants putted a standard golf ball using a handedness-appropriate putter on an 277 
artificial green over short (101 cm or about 3.3 feet) and long (203 cm or about 6.7 feet) 278 
distances. A trial involved two consecutive putts taken from the same starting location (and is 279 
described in detail in the procedure section). To begin each putt within a trial, participants 280 
had to retrieve a ball from a stand placed alongside the green. 281 
Task performance and duration. A missed putt was scored 0 and a holed putt was 282 
scored 1. Task duration for the first putt within a trial was measured from the time when the 283 
ball was retrieved from the stand to when contact between the putter and ball was made. Task 284 
duration for the second putt within a trial was measured as the time elapsed from the putter-285 
ball contact of the first putt to the putter-ball contact of the second putt2. Task performance 286 
and duration on each trial were recorded by a video camera.  287 
Concurrent verbal reports of thinking. Concurrent think-aloud verbal reports were 288 
obtained using Ericsson and Simon’s (1993, p. 375–379) procedures. Prior to starting the 289 
putting trials, participants received standardized instructions to concurrently think-aloud and 290 
then completed two “warm-up” exercises. In the first warm-up exercise, participants thought 291 
aloud while solving simple problems and received feedback until their verbal reports 292 
provided no evidence of explanations and descriptions (i.e., level 3 reports, Ericsson & 293 
Simon, 1993). In the second warm-up exercise, participants practiced thinking aloud while 294 
putting twice over 89 cm (about 2.9 feet). Participants were asked to think aloud from when 295 
they retrieved a ball to begin the first putt of the trial to club-ball contact at the end of the 296 
second putt of that trial. Participants were reminded to “think out loud” if there was a period 297 
of more than 20 s of silence. The reports from the experimental trials were transcribed and 298 
the transcriptions broken into separate statements such as “this putt is longer”. Each statement 299 
was coded on the basis of the function of the verbalized thought the statement contained. A 300 
complete set of categories was developed so each statement could be coded (Ericsson & 301 
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Simon, 1993). In our procedure, the coder would make the decisions about the coding of each 302 
statement in the presented protocol.  303 
A coding scheme with eight categories was developed during a pilot study. The 304 
Assessment code concerned identification of the putt properties (“this is about 6 feet”). 305 
Response identification concerned identification, selection, and planning of the intended ball 306 
path and required putt parameters (“more strength into my swing”). Mechanics concerned the 307 
preparation and production of the putt movement (i.e., body positioning and movement; 308 
“elbow inward”). Psychological preparation concerned psychological preparation to putt 309 
(“concentrate”). Evaluation of previous putt concerned evaluation of the quality of the 310 
previous putt (“that one rolled well”). Goal statement concerned the simple momentary 311 
mediation of attention (“now, I will putt”). Ambiguous concerned task-relevant statements 312 
with an ambiguous function (“that’s kind of hmm”). Task-irrelevant concerned thoughts 313 
unrelated to the task (“I have a test tomorrow”). Coding was mutually exclusive and 314 
exhaustive. Based on these encodings, three categories were formed. First, mechanics 315 
thoughts contained the number of statements per putt coded as mechanics statements. Second, 316 
strategy thoughts consisted of the number of statements per putt coded either as assessment 317 
statements or response identification statements. Finally, task-relevant thoughts contained the 318 
total number of statements per putt coded as task-relevant; that is, mechanics; assessment; 319 
response identification; psychological preparation; evaluation of previous putt; goal 320 
statement; and ambiguous statements3. Coding reliability was assessed by asking a second 321 
trained coder to code the statements (n = 166) for 16 (~2%) randomly selected trials on which 322 
think-aloud data were collected. When data were aggregated into the three categories 323 
Cohen’s kappa was .78 (p < .001), indicating “substantial” agreement (Landis & Koch, 324 
1977). 325 
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Task complexity manipulations. The complexity of the putting task was 326 
manipulated in two ways. First, the study featured two putt length conditions (i.e., short & 327 
long), as detailed above. To check that the long putt was more complex than the short putt, 328 
task self-efficacy was measured by asking “To what extent are you confident in your ability 329 
to hole the putt over this distance?” Responses were provided on a scale ranging from 0% 330 
(not at all confident) to 100% (completely confident) with marking at each decile.  331 
Second, the study featured two stress conditions (low & high), which were created 332 
using instructions adapted from Wilson, Smith, and Holmes (2007). In the low-stress 333 
condition, participants were asked to hole as many putts as possible. In the high-stress 334 
condition, participants were informed that: the recorded videos of their putting would be 335 
analysed by a golf professional, who would check for swing faults and score their putts 336 
relative to an expert’s putting stroke; and their overall putting score would be compared with 337 
other participants’ scores and monetary prizes of up to $100 would be awarded for the best 338 
scores. To check that stress was higher in the high-stress condition than the low-stress 339 
condition, participants’ competitive state anxiety was measured using the Mental Readiness 340 
Form-3 (MRF-3; Krane, 1994). The MRF-3 is a short version of the Competitive State 341 
Anxiety Inventory 2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990), which is 342 
convenient for rapid measurements of anxiety during task performance. The inventory has 343 
separate 11-point items for cognitive anxiety (1 = not worried, 11 = worried); somatic 344 
anxiety (1 = not tense, 11 = tense); and self-confidence (1 = not confident, 11 = confident). 345 
Correlations between the MRF-3 items and the associated CSAI-2 subscales range from .68 346 
to .76 (Krane, 1994). 347 
Procedure 348 
Participants first completed the think-aloud training. Next, for each putt distance 349 
(short & long), participants examined the putt distance and rated their task self-efficacy. 350 
16 
 
Participants then putted under each stress condition (low & high). The order of the stress 351 
conditions was counterbalanced. Within each condition, they received condition-specific 352 
instructions, filled out the MRF-3, and completed a block of five putt trials over each putt 353 
distance. The order of the block types (short putt & long putt) was counterbalanced. Each 354 
trial involved two consecutive putts from the same starting location. Participants retrieved 355 
one ball from a stand located by the green to complete the first putt and then returned to the 356 
stand to retrieve the ball for the second putt. Within each block of trials with the same putting 357 
distance there was a new and different assigned starting location position at the start of each 358 
trial. Thus, the first putt within a trial was always taken from a location different from the 359 
previous putt (i.e., the second putt taken in the previous trial), whereas the second putt within 360 
that trial was always taken from the same location as the previous putt (i.e., the first putt 361 
taken in that trial). In total, participants completed 20 trials (40 putts): 5 trials in each of the 362 
four (i.e., 2 putt lengths crossed with 2 stress conditions) blocks.   363 
Participants were asked to think-aloud during four of the five trials in each block. The 364 
fifth trial without thinking aloud afforded a reactivity test for thinking aloud. Based on prior 365 
research (Fox et al., 2011), task duration for the think-aloud trials was expected to be longer 366 
than for the no-think-aloud trials, whereas task performance was expected to be similar for 367 
both types of trials. The serial position of the single silent no-think-aloud trial was 368 
randomized within the block of five trials in a condition. 369 
Statistical analyses 370 
Alpha was set a priori at α = .05. For each dependent variable, a repeated-measures 371 
analysis of variance was undertaken with group (less-skilled & more-skilled) as the between-372 
subjects factor. The within-subject variable(s) were: putt length (short & long) for task self-373 
efficacy; stress condition (low & high) for each of (a) cognitive anxiety, (b) somatic anxiety, 374 
and (c) self-confidence; putt length and method (no-think-aloud & think-aloud) for task 375 
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performance; putt order (first putt & second putt within a putt trial), stress condition, putt 376 
length, and method for task duration; and putt order, stress condition, and putt length for each 377 
of (a) task-relevant thoughts, (b) strategy thoughts, and (c) mechanics thoughts. Given the 378 
binary nature of the task performance data, holed putts were aggregated over putt order and 379 
stress condition by calculating a mean for the no-think-aloud trials and, separately, the think-380 
aloud trials at each putt length. The analysis featured the putt length and method factors 381 
rather than putt order and stress condition factors because the putt length factor was the most 382 
powerful factor and the method factor afforded a reactivity test for thinking aloud. Data sets 383 
were evaluated for their normality before analysis. Data sets for task duration, strategy 384 
thoughts, and mechanics thoughts were positively skewed. The task duration data were 385 
normalized following log transformation. The strategy thoughts and mechanics thoughts data 386 
were normalized using a square root transformation. Where transformations were used to 387 
normalize data sets, we report back-transformed means and confidence intervals instead of 388 
standard deviations. 389 
Results 390 
Preliminary analyses 391 
Task self-efficacy. The interaction of putt length by group was not significant. There 392 
was a significant main effect of putt length, F (1, 50) = 205.98, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .81, where the 393 
golfers’ self-efficacy was significantly lower for the long putts (M = 58.85, SD = 18.86) than 394 
the short putts (M = 85.58, SD = 12.43). There was a significant main effect of group, F (1, 395 
50) = 5.02, p = .030, η𝑝
2  = .09, where the more-skilled golfers (M = 76.54, SD = 12.31) were 396 
more self-efficacious than the less-skilled golfers (M = 67.88, SD = 15.27).  397 
Competitive state anxiety. The stress condition by group interaction was not 398 
significant in any of the three associated analyses. For cognitive anxiety, there was a 399 
significant main effect of stress condition, F (1, 50) = 11.04, p = .002, η𝑝
2  = .18, where the 400 
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golfers were more cognitively anxious in the high-stress condition (M = 3.38, SD = 2.13) than 401 
the low-stress condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.63). There was also a significant main effect of 402 
group, F (1, 50) = 5.55, p = .022, η𝑝
2  = .10, where the more-skilled golfers (M = 2.44, SD = 403 
0.94) were less cognitively anxious than the less-skilled golfers (M = 3.48, SD = 2.04). For 404 
somatic anxiety, there were no significant main effects of stress condition or group. For self-405 
confidence, there was a significant main effect of stress condition, F (1, 50) = 8.47, p = .005, 406 
η𝑝
2  = .15, where the golfers were less confident in the high-stress condition (M = 8.38, SD = 407 
1.76) than the low-stress condition (M = 8.90, SD = 1.59). There was also a significant main 408 
effect of group, F (1, 50) = 10.68, p = .002, η𝑝
2  = .18, where the more-skilled golfers (M = 409 
9.29, SD = 0.97) were more confident than the less-skilled golfers (M = 8.00, SD = 1.76).  410 
Task performance. The results revealed a significant interaction of putt length by 411 
group, F (1, 50) = 11.30, p = .001, η𝑝
2  = .18. For the short putts, the more-skilled golfers’ task 412 
performance was not significantly different from the less-skilled golfers’ task performance. 413 
However, for the long putts, the more-skilled golfers (M = 72.84% of putts holed, SD = 414 
17.54) performed significantly better than the less-skilled golfers (M = 46.51%, SD = 23.41), 415 
F (1, 50) = 21.06, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .30. There was a significant main effect of putt length, F (1, 416 
50) = 51.20, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .51, where task performance was better for the short putts (M = 417 
83.47%, SD = 14.21) than the long putts (M = 59.68%, SD = 24.41). Consistent with previous 418 
research (Fox et al., 2011), there was no significant main effect of method (i.e., think aloud 419 
vs. no think aloud). There were no other significant main effects or interactions.  420 
Task duration. The results revealed a significant main effect of group, F (1, 50) = 421 
6.21, p = .016, η𝑝
2  = .11, where the more-skilled golfers’ task duration (M = 22.18 s, 95% CI 422 
[19.77, 24.89]) was longer than the less-skilled golfers’ (M = 18.11 s, 95% CI [16.14, 20.32]). 423 
There was a significant main effect of putt length, F (1, 50) = 107.10, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .68, 424 
where task duration was longer for the long putts (M = 21.78 s, 95% CI [20.09, 23.60]) than 425 
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the short putts (M = 18.45 s, 95% CI [16.90, 20.09]). There was also a significant main effect 426 
of stress condition, F (1, 50) = 20.42, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .29, where task duration was longer in 427 
the high-stress condition (M = 21.13 s, 95% CI [19.32, 23.12]) than the low-stress condition 428 
(M = 18.97 s, 95% CI [17.50, 20.56]). Consistent with previous research (Fox et al., 2011), 429 
there was a significant main effect of method, F (1, 50) = 108.48, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .69, where 430 
task duration was longer when participants took time to verbalize their thoughts during the 431 
think-aloud trials (M = 22.44 s, 95% CI [20.56, 24.49]) compared to the silent no-think-aloud 432 
trials (M = 17.86 s, 95% CI [16.48, 19.41]). 433 
The results revealed a significant interaction of putt order by stress condition [F (1, 434 
50) = 4.45, p = .040, η𝑝
2  = .08], method by stress condition [F (1, 50) = 7.01, p = .011, η𝑝
2  = 435 
.12], method by putt order [F (1, 50) = 58.25, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .54], and method by putt order 436 
by stress condition by putt length, [F (1, 50) = 4.42, p = .041, η𝑝
2  = .08]. There were no other 437 
significant main effects or interactions. Among these significant higher-level interactions, the 438 
putt order by stress condition was the only interaction that did not include method as one of 439 
the factors. Differences in the amount of verbalized thoughts between conditions would lead 440 
to differences in the lengthening of the task duration and thus would be a likely source of the 441 
significant interactions. 442 
Interpretation of results in terms of task complexity. The lower task self-efficacy, 443 
poorer task performance, and longer task durations observed for the long putts (vs. short 444 
putts) condition imply that putting complexity was higher in this condition. The higher 445 
cognitive state anxiety, lower self-confidence, and longer task durations observed for the 446 
high-stress (vs. low-stress) condition imply that putting complexity was higher in this 447 
condition. 448 
Verbal report data analysis 449 
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Task-relevant thoughts. The results revealed a significant main effect of group, F (1, 450 
50) = 8.25, p = .006, η𝑝
2  = .14, where the more-skilled golfers (M = 5.97, SD = 2.52) 451 
verbalized more task-relevant thoughts than the less-skilled golfers (M = 4.08, SD = 2.22). 452 
There was a significant main effect of putt length, F (1, 50) = 28.00, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .36, 453 
where more task-relevant thoughts were verbalized during the long putts (M = 5.30, SD = 454 
2.60) than the short putts (M = 4.75, SD = 2.54). In addition, a significant interaction of putt 455 
length by group was found, F (1, 50) = 5.37, p = .025, η𝑝
2  = .10. The increase in putt length 456 
led to the verbalization of more task-relevant thoughts for both the less-skilled golfers, F (1, 457 
50) = 5.37, p = .041, η𝑝
2  = .08, and the more-skilled golfers, F (1, 50) = 28.95, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = 458 
.37, but the increase was greater (d = 0.20) for the more-skilled golfers. The less-skilled 459 
golfers verbalized a mean of 3.93 (SD = 2.16) thoughts during the short putts and 4.24 (SD = 460 
2.31) thoughts during the long putts; whereas the more-skilled golfers verbalized a mean of 461 
5.58 (SD = 2.66) thoughts during the short putts and 6.37 (SD = 2.45) thoughts during the 462 
long putts.  463 
There was also a significant interaction of putt order by group, F (1, 50) = 4.25, p = 464 
.045, η𝑝
2  = .08. The more-skilled golfers verbalized significantly more task-relevant thoughts 465 
during the first putts (M = 6.31, SD = 2.60) than the second putts (M = 5.64, SD = 2.49), F (1, 466 
50) = 23.77, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .32. However, for the less-skilled golfers, there was no significant 467 
difference on this variable between the first putts and the second putts. There was a 468 
significant interaction of putt order by stress, F (1, 50) = 5.02, p = .030, η𝑝
2  = .09. During the 469 
first putts, more task-relevant thoughts were verbalized in the high-stress condition (M = 470 
5.51, SD = 2.61) than the low-stress condition (M = 5.01, SD = 2.70), F (1, 50) = 8.82, p = 471 
.005, η𝑝
2  = .15. However, during the second putts, there was no significant difference on this 472 
variable between the high-stress condition and the low-stress condition. There were no other 473 
significant main effects or interactions. 474 
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Strategy thoughts. The results revealed a significant main effect of group, F (1, 50) = 475 
12.12, p = .001, η𝑝
2  = .20, where the more-skilled golfers (M = 1.47, 95% CI [1.11, 1.88]) 476 
verbalized more strategy thoughts than the less-skilled golfers (M = 0.67, 95% CI [0.44, 477 
0.96]). There was a significant main effect of putt length, F (1, 50) = 9.09, p = .004, η𝑝
2  = .15, 478 
where more strategy thoughts were verbalized during the long putts (M = 1.15, 95% CI [0.92, 479 
1.41]) than the short putts (M = 0.92, 95% CI [0.70, 1.17]). There was a significant main 480 
effect of putt order, F (1, 50) = 38.15, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .43, where more strategy thoughts were 481 
verbalized during the first putts (M = 1.27, 95% CI [1.00, 1.57]) than the second putts (M = 482 
0.82, 95% CI [0.63, 1.03]). The main effect of stress condition was not significant. None of 483 
the interactions was significant. 484 
Mechanics thoughts. The main effects of group, putt length, and stress condition 485 
were not significant. There was a significant main effect of putt order, F (1, 50) = 7.90, p = 486 
.007, η𝑝
2  = .14, where more mechanics thoughts were verbalized during the first putts (M = 487 
0.95, 95% CI [0.65, 1.30]) than the second putts (M = 0.81, 95% CI [0.54, 1.13]). None of the 488 
interactions was significant. 489 
Summary and Discussion 490 
According to the automaticity account (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Fitts & Posner, 1967), 491 
the more-skilled golfers were predicted to verbalize fewer thoughts during the putting task 492 
than the less-skilled golfers, consistent with the pattern observed by Beilock and Carr (2001) 493 
in their participants’ written descriptions. Our study, which used a think-aloud verbal report 494 
method, revealed essentially the reverse pattern: The more-skilled golfers verbalized 495 
significantly more thoughts per putt (~2 more) than the less-skilled golfers. This result is 496 
consistent with the cognitive control account of skilled performance (Ericsson & Kintsch, 497 
1995).  498 
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According to the cognitive control account, both the more-skilled and less-skilled 499 
golfers were predicted to verbalize more thoughts during higher-complexity putts (i.e., longer 500 
distance putts & putts under higher stress) than lower-complexity putts. The automaticity 501 
account would not predict an effect on verbalized thoughts of these “complexity” 502 
manipulations for the more-skilled golfers; only the less-skilled golfers would be predicted to 503 
generate more thoughts during higher-complexity putts. Our results indicate that both the 504 
more-skilled and the less-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant thoughts when 505 
performing longer distance putts. The effect of increasing putt length on the number of 506 
verbalized thoughts was greater for the more-skilled golfers than the less-skilled golfers. 507 
These results are consistent with the cognitive control account. The results also showed that 508 
both the more-skilled and the less-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant thoughts 509 
when putting under higher stress, but only if they encountered a new putting location (i.e., the 510 
first putt within a two-putt trial); see the results of the analyses of the effect of putt order on 511 
task-relevant thoughts. If the golfers executed the same putt from the same location (i.e., the 512 
second putt within a two-putt trial), putting under higher stress did not affect the number of 513 
task-relevant thoughts. In addition, the more-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant 514 
thoughts when they encountered a new putting location, as compared to executing the same 515 
putt from the same location; in contrast, this difference was not observed for the less-skilled 516 
golfers. These results are more consistent with the cognitive control account of skilled 517 
performance than the automaticity account.  518 
The analyses of mechanics thoughts revealed that the number of verbalized thoughts 519 
related to putting mechanics did not significantly differ between the groups. Putting from a 520 
new location was the only condition that affected the number of mechanics-related thoughts. 521 
Specifically, during the first putt within a two-putt trial, almost one thought on average (M = 522 
0.95) was verbalized related to putting mechanics, whereas this value was slightly but 523 
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significantly less for the second putt (M = 0.81). Both skill groups verbalized less than one 524 
thought related to putting mechanics per putt on average, which corresponds to less than 15% 525 
of all task-relevant thoughts. 526 
The analyses of the strategy thoughts revealed that the more-skilled golfers verbalized 527 
a considerable amount of thoughts concerning strategic features of putting (~1.5 per putt on 528 
average) and significantly more of these thoughts (~1 more per putt on average) than the less-529 
skilled golfers. One of the two putt complexity manipulations affected the number of strategy 530 
thoughts verbalized. Specifically, more strategy thoughts were verbalized during the long 531 
putts than the short putts; but the number of strategy thoughts did not differ between the low- 532 
and high-stress conditions. Also, more strategy thoughts were verbalized during the first putt 533 
within a two-putt trial than the second putt within a two-putt trial. 534 
General Discussion 535 
The purpose of this study was to test the automaticity and cognitive control accounts 536 
of skilled performance by examining thoughts reported by less-skilled and more-skilled 537 
golfers during putting. The results of our study support the cognitive control account of 538 
skilled performance. Note that our conclusions differ from those reported in related studies by 539 
other researchers (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Toner & Moran, 2011). We will now address 540 
those differences in detail.  541 
Toner and Moran (2011) studied a single group of expert golfers with a mean 542 
handicap of 3.56, which is similar to that of our more-skilled group. They used a longer putt 543 
distance (i.e., more complex putt) than our longest putt distance. Therefore, based on the 544 
cognitive control account, Toner and Moran’s group of golfers should have verbalized more 545 
thoughts than our more-skilled group. However, Toner and Moran’s golfers reported only 546 
two thoughts per putt on average, which is roughly four thoughts less than our more-skilled 547 
golfers. An informal review of the verbalized thoughts presented by Toner and Moran (see 548 
24 
 
Table IV, p. 680) shows that, although their skilled golfers reported fewer thoughts than ours, 549 
the content of the thoughts is similar across the two studies. Consistent with our study, Toner 550 
and Moran found relatively few thoughts related to putting mechanics: An average of 551 
approximately one such thought per putt was reported, which is similar to our findings. 552 
Thus, the primary difference between Toner and Moran’s (2011) study and our study 553 
concerns the amount of strategy thoughts verbalized, which might be due to procedural 554 
differences. In our study participants were given the standard think-aloud instructions, which 555 
included warm-up exercises lasting 15–20 minutes (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Fox et al., 556 
2011), prior to their first putt while thinking aloud. In contrast, Toner and Moran’s expert 557 
golfers were not provided with such warm-up exercises. They first took 5 practice putts under 558 
silent (i.e., no-think-aloud) conditions. Then, within a main testing phase, they took another 559 
20 putts. Immediately after the 10th putt in this 20-putt series, “The dictaphone was switched 560 
on and participants were instructed to state aloud any thoughts relating to the task of which 561 
they were consciously aware. Participants were instructed to state aloud any task-related 562 
thoughts while they were addressing the ball and once the putt had been executed” (p. 678). 563 
When the golfers had finished stating such thoughts, the dictaphone was switched off and the 564 
golfers completed the final 10 putts in the 20 putt series under silent conditions. There were 565 
several other details of their procedure that might have affected the amount of thoughts 566 
verbalized. Most importantly, all 15 putts prior to verbalization involved the same putting 567 
task with the same putting location and distance to the hole. Our study found a significant 568 
reduction of verbalized thoughts after repeating the same putt only once, so performing the 569 
same putt 15 times is likely to lead to further reductions in thoughts and thus verbalized 570 
thoughts. Only future research will tell whether the procedural differences between the 571 
studies can account for the differences in the amount of thoughts verbalized, especially 572 
strategy thoughts. 573 
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There are qualitative differences in methodology between our study and the study by 574 
Beilock and Carr (2001). Nonetheless, some results concerning the amount of overall 575 
reported steps/thoughts were comparable across the two studies. For example, on average, the 576 
amount of steps per putt reported by the expert golfers in Beilock and Carr’s Experiment 1 577 
was 5.56 and the amount of thoughts per putt reported by our more-skilled golfers was 5.97. 578 
However, unlike our study, Beilock and Carr found fewer recalled thoughts for expert golfers 579 
than novice golfers. Also, when the reported information is analysed in terms of content, we 580 
find striking differences between our study and Beilock and Carr’s study in terms of reports 581 
concerning putting mechanics and putting strategy. For example, the expert golfers in 582 
Experiment 1 by Beilock and Carr reported an average of 3.63 mechanics-related steps per 583 
putt, whereas this value was 1.14 for our more-skilled golfers. 584 
Differences in the methodology between the two studies likely account for most of the 585 
differences in the results of the two studies. In our study, participants were instructed to 586 
verbally express their thoughts while putting without any direction as to what should be 587 
reported. In contrast, as we stated above, Beilock and Carr (2001, Experiment 1) instructed 588 
their participants to describe the last putt they took to a friend so that the friend could perform 589 
the same putt. An example of a description provided by an expert in their study is as follows: 590 
“1) Look up at putt, 2) Place putter behind ball with the head square at the target, 3) Look at 591 
target, 4) Look at putter and ball, 5) Take putter back, 6) Swing through ball, 7) Look up at 592 
target” (p. 706). The written steps do not appear to reflect the sequence of the golfer’s inner 593 
thoughts but instead the sequence of the golfer’s external actions, which actually could have 594 
been observed by an observer of the golfer, assuming the observer considered the direction of 595 
the golfer’s eyes. This is the type of report that Nisbett and Wilson (1977) described as an 596 
introspective report, where thinking and perception is inferred from observed actions. If 597 
Beilock and Carr had collected their written descriptions on multiple occasions for every 598 
26 
 
golfer, one would expect the descriptions to be very similar because they appear to primarily 599 
contain steps that would not differ from putt to putt. These introspective reports are 600 
fundamentally different from concurrent verbalizations of thinking produced using the think-601 
aloud procedure (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). If Beilock and Carr’s findings reflect 602 
introspections rather than direct verbalizations of thoughts, then these findings do not have 603 
any relevance for understanding skill-related differences in thinking during putting. 604 
Limitations 605 
This study included a range of putting conditions that could be realized in a laboratory 606 
setting and found that longer distance putts, and putts made under higher stress from a new 607 
starting location led to increases in the amount of thoughts verbalized during the putt. 608 
However, attempting a novel putt at a golf course during a real competition on a real putting 609 
green, with its undulating grass surface, is undoubtedly more complex. In particular, our 610 
stress manipulation cannot come close to producing the stress of playing in an actual golf 611 
tournament. The disparity between the experimental and real environments is likely to 612 
explain why somatic anxiety was not significantly affected by our stress manipulation. The 613 
disparity is also likely to explain why, even though cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 614 
were significantly affected by the manipulation, cognitive anxiety remained relatively low 615 
and self-confidence remained relatively high in absolute terms following the manipulation.  616 
Thus, we predict that under conditions that involve executing each putt only once on a real 617 
green and/or better representations of the stress of a real tournament, golfers will generate 618 
even more thoughts and the content of these thoughts will differ as a function of skill.  619 
An additional consideration when interpreting our results is that we did not assess or 620 
control for golfers’ experiences of yips, a motor phenomenon characterized by an involuntary 621 
movement that can affect putting performance (Klämpfl, Lobinger, & Raab, 2013). A 622 
reviewer (Dr. Martin Klämpfl) also proposed that golfers use putting routines and therefore 623 
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similar thought profiles should be observed regardless of the type or complexity of putt, 624 
which is not what was found here. Unfortunately, we did not collect data on the golfers’ 625 
personal putting routines. We accept that some studies of how skilled performers of closed 626 
skills prepare to execute these skills have revealed that their preparatory behaviours, and the 627 
sequence of these behaviours, are relatively invariant and thus routine, even in the face of 628 
changes to perceived task difficultly (e.g., Jackson & Baker, 2001). However, there are 629 
currently few available data in the form of concurrently verbalized thoughts during 630 
preparatory routines. Research is needed to identify using the think aloud method the extent 631 
to which the quantity and quality of such thoughts depend on task difficulty, even if the 632 
behavioural sequence of the routines stays the same. Finally, our study was not double-blind 633 
concerning group membership, so the possibility must be considered that the experimenter 634 
implicitly encouraged the more skilled-golfers to verbalize more thoughts than the less-635 
skilled golfers. Nonetheless, to reduce this possibility, all thought elicitations procedures 636 
were standardized, such that these procedures were identical for members of each group. 637 
Concluding Remarks 638 
The present study provides evidence that supports the cognitive control account of 639 
skilled performance and is mostly inconsistent with the automaticity account of performance 640 
on the putting task. Our findings suggest that different cognitive mechanisms mediate expert 641 
performance than the habitual performance of “everyday” tasks. The performance of 642 
everyday tasks may rely on recognition and direct retrieval of actions from LTM and thus 643 
require little attention (Anderson, 1982; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Fitts & Posner, 1967), 644 
whereas expert performance may depend on rapidly accessible storage and retrieval 645 
structures in LTWM (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) that allow participants to generate controlled 646 
actions appropriate to the task at hand. 647 
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Our results also provide evidence that cognitive control in skilful action is a key to the 648 
control of strategic features of a task, and this control becomes progressively more important 649 
as the complexity of the task increases. Jack Nicklaus, a former world-class golfer, claims 650 
that setting up for a putt took him a long time because he needed “time to concentrate on all 651 
the factors of speed and line and grain involved.” (1974, p. 78). Ericsson (2001) argues that 652 
expert golfers like Nicklaus are very deliberate in their assessment about how to aim a putt in 653 
a given putting situation.  654 
Consequently, we propose that the recommendation that athletes should avoid 655 
thinking when performing must be reconsidered. However, we are not proposing that more 656 
thinking is always better in all situations. In our analysis of the putting task, we distinguish 657 
between the processes involved in preparing and planning to generate a putt with desired 658 
characteristics, where these characteristics serve as input to the execution of the motor 659 
system, and the actual mechanical execution of the putt. We find evidence of considerable 660 
thinking occurring during the preparatory and planning period prior to the initiation of the 661 
putting action (i.e., strategic thoughts) and comparatively few thoughts involved in the 662 
mechanical execution of the putt (i.e., mechanics thoughts). There is strong evidence that 663 
golfers generate a stable mental state prior to executing the putt (c.f. the quiet eye period, 664 
Vine, Moore, & Wilson, 2011). However, the distinction between preparation and the actual 665 
execution is not evident in Beilock et al.’s (2004, p. 379) recommendation to experts to “Just 666 
do it”, which could be interpreted by expert golfers as a direction to avoid thinking both 667 
before and during the actual execution of the putt. In fact, Beilock and Carr (2001) explicitly 668 
referred to a complete procedure for performing the entire putt task, including both putt 669 
preparation and execution in their study of expert golfers. 670 
Consistent with our rejection of the recommended avoidance of thinking by athletes, 671 
Winter et al. (2014) suggest avoiding general instructions that imply that “actual thinking” is 672 
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problematic. Likewise, Montero (2015) proposes that athletes practice “motor routines in 673 
such a way so that they do not become proceduralized to such a degree that attention and 674 
control interfere with their performance” (p. 382). One means of avoiding such 675 
proceduralization that has theoretical and empirical support involves seeking out deliberate 676 
practice activities (Ericsson et al., 1993). Such activities are specifically designed by coaches 677 
and teachers to improve particular aspects of skills that enable performers to overcome 678 
plateaus and avoid the arrested development associated with automaticity. Expert 679 
performance involves the acquisition of mental representations for imaging desired outcomes, 680 
planning the execution of performance, and modifying and refining performance during 681 
practice (Ericsson, 2006a; Ericsson & Pool, 2016). 682 
Our results also showed that the execution of putts from the same location again and 683 
again can be a confounding factor that influences the amount and content of thinking during 684 
laboratory experiments. The number of factors that are relevant to the putting task on real 685 
greens is far greater than on laboratory putting greens and thus skilled golfers are likely 686 
engage in more thinking when playing on real courses than lower-skilled players. Whitehead, 687 
Taylor, and Polman (2016) showed that the thought processes of highly skilled golfers 688 
playing on a real golf course change in response to competitive pressure, but this was not true 689 
for less-skilled golfers. An important challenge for future research studying differences in 690 
putting skill will be to have participants perform identical putting tasks on actual golf 691 
courses. 692 
In conclusion, this study has provided evidence that skilled task performance does not 693 
become fully automatic, as suggested by skill acquisition theories of everyday habitual 694 
activity, but remains mediated by thinking, especially when there is need to adapt 695 
performance when facing complex and variable conditions. Expert performers are motivated 696 
to continue to improve their current level of performance by refining and increasing their 697 
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control of at least some aspects of their performance. Their efforts to refine such aspects are 698 
inconsistent with the development of full automaticity that is typically observed in 699 
individuals habitually performing everyday tasks. The central finding of this study is that 700 
expert performers build mental representations and engage in thinking that supports the 701 
preparation and planning of their performance. Researchers and practitioners should therefore 702 
encourage the development of knowledge about when and how skilled performers can 703 
improve their performance by acquiring mental representations for planning, evaluating and 704 
modifying their performance.  705 
Endnotes 706 
1. We appreciate that there was a gender imbalance across the groups. To check the effect of 707 
this imbalance on our findings, we conducted additional analyses using only the less-708 
skilled golfers’ verbal report data. Repeated-measures analyses of variance were 709 
undertaken with gender as the between-subjects factor. The results showed no significant 710 
main effect of gender for task-relevant, strategy, and mechanics thoughts. 711 
2. Task duration was not operationalized identically for the first and second putts within a 712 
trial because, immediately following putter-ball contact for the first putt, participants 713 
often verbalized thoughts concerned with evaluations of the first putt. These thoughts 714 
likely affected their preparation for the second putt, in part because the putt starting 715 
location for the second putt was always the same as for first putt within a trial. 716 
Consequently, the appropriate onset point for the task duration measure of the second putt 717 
was putter-ball contact for the first putt. Unlike the second putt within a trial, the first putt 718 
was not taken immediately after the previous putt (i.e., the second putt in the previous 719 
trial) because trials were separated by a short break, and was not taken from the same 720 
starting location as the previous putt, because this location was always different between 721 
any two contiguous trials. Thus, for the first putt in a trial, participants typically did not 722 
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begin to assess the demands of the putt until after retrieving the ball from the stand to 723 
begin that putt, and thus the appropriate onset point for the task duration measure for the 724 
first putt was act of retrieving the ball from the stand. 725 
3. Ambiguous statements accounted for approximately 15% of task-relevant thoughts within 726 
each group. Excluding ambiguous statements from subsequent analyses does not change 727 
any result. 728 
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